



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 9

## Are We Realistic About Communist Powers?

by William R. Frye

UNITED NATIONS—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's Thanksgiving Day proposal for a showdown on Berlin has squarely raised the question, Is the West realistic in its policy about the Communist powers, or should it revise its policy?

The over-all Sino-Soviet objective is consolidation of postwar territorial gains in order to firm up the base for future expansion in Asia and Africa—in all probability by economic and political rather than overtly military means.

It is a challenge to test the mettle of the West. The weakness of Western counter-strategy has been the absence of an affirmative policy either of sufficient pressure to force a rollback of the enemy's frontiers or of acceptance of those frontiers and disengagement from contact along them.

Is there any approach for the West which would take advantage of the best of both policies—that is, which would benefit from both rollback and disengagement? Khrushchev's effort to maneuver the West out of Berlin, carrying with it, despite backing and filling in Moscow, a clearly implied offer to negotiate a settlement in Central Europe,

forces the West to face up to the problem.

In attempting to suggest the possible outlines of a new policy for the West, with respect to the Communist bloc, UN analysts start from the following assumptions, among others:

1. Western Europe is no more eager to see a reunified, rearmed Germany than are the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Both Eastern and Western Europe have vivid memories of 1914 and 1939.

2. The Kremlin may well be genuinely alarmed over the possibility of another Hungary, either in East Germany or elsewhere in the satellite empire. There is, therefore, a motive for Khrushchev to pull out of Eastern Europe if Western power and influence would not flow into the resulting vacuum.

3. The peacemaking resources of the UN have scarcely begun to be tapped, let alone exhausted, with respect to Central and Eastern Europe.

Working from these premises, UN analysts ask, Why would it not be practical, and to the West's advantage, to strive for political freedom and military neutralization under the umbrella of a UN peace force, in a zone of

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Central Europe embracing a united Germany and its Eastern neighbors?

Specifically, the settlement might have the following ingredients, it is suggested here:

1. A gradual, phased withdrawal of Soviet and Western forces from West Germany and Eastern Europe, with UN inspection to verify compliance.

2. Unification of Germany, also in stages, beginning with a confederation of the eastern and western sectors, as Moscow has proposed.

3. Consent by a reunited Germany to Poland's present frontiers, or to some agreed alternative.

### What Kind of Disarmament?

4. Disarmament, or relative disarmament, for Germany under UN inspection and surveillance. Such inspection might not be foolproof in the nonatomic field, but it could prevent the development of atomic armaments and thus keep Germany relatively impotent. Under the Rapacki plan, proposed by the Polish government, such restrictions and such inspection could be extended to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and probably elsewhere.

5. Air and ground inspection of the entire zone, plus at least a slice of European Russia, to guard against surprise attack by conventional forces.

6. A UN peace force to patrol the borders of the zone and thus provide a kind of plate-glass window, or a means to maximize the damage to the Soviet Union if it sent the Red army back into an area it had once

evacuated. An attack by Russia on the UN would provide the West with the moral justification it would need for a counterblow—and this would be the real deterrent.

### Disengagement Plus Rollback

The net effect of such a scheme would be both disengagement and rollback.

The Soviet Union would make much the greater sacrifice of real estate; the West would probably sacrifice more actual military potential. The satellite armies are scarcely a plus factor for the Kremlin; and occupation of Eastern Europe is a military advantage primarily in that it provides Russia with a buffer zone. A neutralized Eastern Europe would be at least as good a buffer.

In exchange for whatever military sacrifice the West would make, however, it would gain an immense political boon. Sooner or later—and probably sooner—when the Red army ceased to prop up Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, those regimes would topple like dominoes. Millions of human beings who have suffered for years, including the brave Hungarian people, would be relieved of the tyranny of Communist rule.

There is, of course, no assurance that the Kremlin would agree to any such plan. But it would give the Kremlin one thing it badly wants—a curb on the rearmament of West Germany. And so far as Eastern Europe is concerned, ever since 1956 the Kremlin has been proposing various forms of disengagement, of-

ten including a partial or total withdrawal of the Red army from the satellite empire.

If the Kremlin balked at such a plan, it would at least be Khrushchev, and not Western leaders, who would be saying "No." The element of inconsistency in the Soviet stand would also be a major Western propaganda asset.

If the Kremlin were to agree, NATO would be forced to make severe readjustments in dispositions and strategy. The whole basis of European security would be shifted from the NATO "shield" to a combination of UN, tripwire, plus an atomic deterrent.

The very attempt to negotiate such a scheme might alienate Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany. Adenauer is wedded to the idea of a reunited Germany free to join NATO—that is to say, he is wedded to no realistic negotiations at all.

These and other perils would have to be faced. But the danger of positive action is no greater, and is probably much less great, than the danger of merely clinging to the *status quo*, UN experts believe.

At any rate, it may be impossible to cling to the *status quo* between the West and the Communist bloc. Khrushchev appears determined to force a reorientation of Western policy.

Mr. Frye, a member of the staff of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1941, has been its United Nations correspondent for eight years. (This is the third of nine articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1959"—Reshaping Foreign Policy Amid Revolutions—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

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## How U.S.I.A. Pierces Iron Curtain

This may seem a paradox, but as the East-West political war gets colder, there are signs that the East-West cultural war is thawing. The Russians may be re-enforcing the Iron Curtain, but new holes are being punched in it continually.

It is true that in 1958 East and West were at swords' points over the Middle East, the Far East and Berlin. But it is also true that within the past 12 months social and cultural relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States have improved, even though their diplomatic relations have deteriorated.

One example is the exchange of persons. As a result of the Lacy-Zaroubin cultural exchange agreement of January 1958, some 5,000 Americans have visited the U.S.S.R. Such notables as Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Walter Lippmann and Eric Johnston have interviewed Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. Fewer Russians have visited the United States, but the number is greater than ever before, and it is growing. American students are attending Moscow and Leningrad universities; Russian students live on American campuses with American students. The Moiseyev and Beryozka dance companies visited this country; the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra and pianist Van Cliburn have been triumphantly acclaimed in Moscow. There have been exchanges of industrialists, educators, scientists. This two-way flow of inquisitive people is on the increase—and Washington would like to see it reach 50,000 a year in each direction.

Another example is the use of

radio—the Voice of America. The Russians, it is true, spend \$100 million a year trying to jam the V.O.A.—but only around their major cities. The V.O.A. English, French and German broadcasts get through to the Russian people. What the Soviet government spends trying to jam the “Voice” is as much as the United States spends on cultural relations in all fields all around the world.

### 'Truth Missile'

George V. Allen, the soft-spoken, hard-working director of U.S.I.A. (the United States Information Agency) calls the “Voice” our ICTM—Intercontinental Truth Missile. But this missile is not a one-shot-a-month affair. It broadcasts in 37 languages every day, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It puts out more words daily than the Columbia Broadcasting System and the National Broadcasting Company combined. Some of its transmitters are 20 times more powerful than the most powerful commercial transmitter in this country. To increase the effectiveness of the “Voice,” the United States is starting construction on the East Coast of a transmitting facility of vast power that will counteract at least some of the Soviet jamming.

Few Americans know of, or appreciate, the monthly magazine published by the U.S.I.A. in Russian, *America Illustrated*, which tells the American story dramatically in word and picture and which is avidly read by Russians. This magazine is sold openly on the newsstands in the Soviet Union at the rate of 50,000 copies a month and passes from hand to hand until virtually torn to

pieces. As many as 100 persons may read a single copy. As a *quid pro quo*, a Soviet magazine, *U.S.S.R.*, is sold on American newsstands. Every once in a while, as currently in Wisconsin, someone starts a drive to forbid the sale of *U.S.S.R.* here—totally unaware that the reciprocal right to sell *America Illustrated* in Russia is vastly more valuable to Washington than *U.S.S.R.* can ever be to Moscow.

Films also provide a means of penetrating the Iron Curtain. A film exchange has just been concluded with Moscow which permits American movies to be shown in the U.S.S.R. for the first time since the 1930's. Ten American feature films, plus some documentaries, have been selected for showing in the U.S.S.R. in exchange for the showing of six Soviet movies in the United States.

But the current cultural project which perhaps excites Mr. Allen and his colleagues more than any other is the plan next summer to put on in the heart of Moscow an American exhibition showing our cultural, industrial and technological progress. The Russians will at the same time present an exhibit at the Coliseum in New York. The American exhibit will draw millions of Russians. Plans call for presenting RAMAC (the electric computer brain), an American voting booth, “Circarama” (Disney's 360 degree movie machine), music by the Chicago Symphony Orchestra; modern ballet and a jazz festival. And there will, of course, be a variety of exhibits by American industry of machinery, consumer goods, gadgets, and so on.

Piercing the Iron Curtain may be the more spectacular business of the



U.S.I.A.—but it is far from being all of its business. For the neutralist world—the countries of Asia and Africa in particular—needs to be given a proper picture of the United States to counteract the distorted pictures which Moscow's propaganda machine feeds them of Uncle

Sam. To do that, U.S.I.A. maintains in 80 countries some 200 information posts which are an official part of United States embassies and consulates. It underwrites the publication in 50 languages of millions of books on democracy, many of them paperbacks selling for 10 or 15 cents.

It holds classes in English, operates libraries, sponsors lectures, shows documentary films.

It is admittedly difficult for the U.S.I.A. to perform its work. Nevertheless it is doing so in an increasingly effective way.

NEAL STANFORD



#### FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

## Africans Discover Africa

At two conferences concerning African affairs held during December—one at Accra and the other in Cairo—a prediction made by Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was strikingly fulfilled. Dr. Nkrumah had once said that while in the 19th century Europeans discovered Africa, in the 20th century Africans would discover their own continent. This discovery is taking place, at a much faster pace than anyone had anticipated. And it is taking place in spite of the territorial division of Africa by the Western powers in the 19th century and of the natural obstacles to communications between various sections of the continent.

The nongovernmental All-African People's Conference at Accra, capital of the new state of Ghana, was attended by nationalist leaders from all parts of the continent, who showed a lively interest in and knowledge of conditions throughout Africa. The correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*, John Hughes, commented particularly on this aspect of the gathering. "One of the most impressive features of the conference," he said, "was the manner in which delegates ranged the length and breadth of Africa in their thoughts. Delegates from Kenya were vitally concerned for the welfare of their fellow Africans in the Union of South Africa, and African

nationalists a few thousand miles away in West Africa expressed an intelligent and informed interest in the constitutional structure of the Central African Federation of the Rhodesias."

Other commentators described the rise of a Pan-African movement revealing the emergence of an African identity, about which Nkrumah has eloquently spoken in the past—an identity separate from that of the Asians and Arabs, with whom the newly independent African peoples have been hitherto identified in the Afro-Asian-Arab bloc at the United Nations.

### Nationalism with Moderation

Yet the rising nationalism of Africa has so far been characterized by a sense of moderation and maturity on the part of those leaders whose countries have already achieved independence or who have had extensive political experience in still colonial territories. A debate on the relative merits of violence or non-violence in seeking independence from colonial powers resulted in a victory for the advocates of nonviolence, led by Nkrumah and Tom Mboya of Kenya, a vigorous trade unionist and leader of elected African members in the Kenya legislature, over the advocates of violence, chiefly Egyptians and repre-

sentatives of the Algerian rebels.

Nor did the majority of delegates use this occasion to castigate the West. On the contrary, Nkrumah said that there is more than one kind of colonialism against which Africans must be on guard. Colonialism, he argued, comes not solely from Europe; it comes also from other areas in new guises—a phrase which was variously interpreted as applicable to the Soviet bloc or to Egypt's efforts under Nasser to penetrate into Africa. At the same time, Nkrumah has shown that he will deal with all nations on the basis not of ideology, but of the merits of a given situation. He is ready to accept Soviet aid if it comes without strings; hopes to obtain United States financial aid for his Volta River hydroelectric project; and has sided with Egypt on the Algerian question. He receives substantial aid from Israel, but at the same time gets along with the Arab nations and maintains correct relations with the Union of South Africa, which has made clear that its policy toward independent African nations will be free of the *apartheid* philosophy it applies at home.

It is significant that, at Accra, Nkrumah made no reference to the Bandung conference of Asian-African nations in 1955, apparently in an

(Continued on page 72)

## What Should U.S. Do About Nuclear Tests?

While nuclear weapons pile up, the debate goes on about the pros and cons of continuing nuclear tests. Here are three contrasting views.

### Continue Tests

*Dr. Willard F. Libby, scientist member of the Atomic Energy Commission, was interviewed November 16 on "Face the Nation" over CBS-TV. Members of the panel were William H. Lawrence of The New York Times, Nat S. Finney of the Buffalo Evening News and George Herman of CBS News, with Stuart Novins as moderator. Here are the highlights as reported in the New York Post on November 23.*

Herman: While the diplomats work in Geneva, what is our own situation as far as tests are concerned? Did we get all the tests we wanted in under the wire, or do we have another test series ready to go if the talks at Geneva should fail?

Libby: Our test series was not quite completed, but the way it goes is that you study the results and then you prepare for further work. And I would say that essentially most of our objectives were attained.

Finney: One of the Russians at Geneva has made the accusation that the United States is attempting to protract or prolong those talks so that it can prepare for another series of tests, while the whole business of testing is in suspension. Can you comment on that?

Libby: There is not a bit of truth in that. Our objective at Geneva is to attain a controlled cessation, not only of testing, but a beginning on disarmament, and we are anxious that the matter of controls be assured.

Finney: Would it be true that we are not suspending our work at our

laboratories which, generally speaking, is done pursuant to future testing?

Libby: That's quite right. We are not suspending our work at our laboratories, and we are at the present time engaged in digesting the results of past experiments, and are planning for the possible future ones in case the negotiations should break down.

And an important additional function in our laboratories is to prepare for the nonmilitary applications of nuclear explosions, the so-called Plowshare Project, where we make harbors, make canals, remove overburden from mining properties, open up mining properties underground. We have many possible applications and the weapons laboratories are turning their attention more and more to this very important Plowshare Project. But we want to keep them strong. They are a principal asset of our national defense. . . .

Lawrence: Is there any merit at all in the Soviet allegation that they need some more testing to catch up with us?

Libby: I do believe that the Soviet Union is behind us in our nuclear armament. But the Soviet Union has a different position. We are not going to attack them unprovoked, and so we need defensive weapons which are ready to go on the instant all over the enormous area we have to protect. And this requires a much more complete type of nuclear armament than an offensive armament requires, and this is the essence of it.

Herman: Then, when you say that

the Russians are behind us, you mean in variety and technique of weapons, rather than, necessarily, in numbers?

Libby: Both.

Novins: In connection with the question Mr. Lawrence asked you a moment ago regarding the Russian and the United States progress in terms of testing, from another point of view, the point of view of fallout: you monitor all of these tests, obviously, and you keep a pretty close track on radiation.

Can you tell us whether the Russians or the United States have polluted the air more in the tests that have so far transpired?

Libby: We have not completed our measurements on the last Russian series, which was a very heavy one, so it is very difficult for me to answer. Depends on how the winds blow, and how the fallout actually occurs.

Novins: Do you see any evidence in the radiation checking that you have been making that the Russians are attempting to produce a so-called "clean" bomb?

Libby: Not a bit. I'm discouraged about this, for I think that it's an important development, to give the generals the alternative of not destroying thousands of square miles of good farmlands unless they want to. You understand that the fallout from a normal or what you might call a dirty device, a normal fission device, will blanket out and make unfit for farming several thousand square miles of farmland for every megaton surface burst.

Now you think what that means

in a military campaign. It may be as much as 10 percent of your farming area is gone for 40 years or something like that; and this is a thing which they may not want to do. The clean bomb allows them this alternative, affords them this alternative.

Now, you may say that the clean bomb itself is horrible, and that is true. The clean bomb is, but it does at least offer the possibility of separating the blast and thermal effects from the fallout effects.

### **Underground Tests Only**

*Senator Albert Gore, D., Tenn., served as Senate-adviser member of the United States delegation to the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The following is excerpted from an article written by him for the New York Herald Tribune, copyrighted by them on November 15, and reproduced here with the permission of that paper and the author.*

Day after day for two solid weeks, as a Senate-adviser member of the United States delegation to the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, I have been across the conference table from the Russian delegation. I have been trying to discern the conference aims of the Soviets and trying, too, to decide what the United States should do, now that we are party to what is generally described as a stalemate on the vital subject of atomic tests. . . .

There are two big and tremendously important factors involved in this conference: 1. The military strength of the West as compared with the Communists, and 2. The moral and political position of the United States in a world increasingly affected by world public opinion. They are inseparable and essential parts of a national necessity.

The delegation at Geneva, then,

is walking narrowly between an act which it is hoped will lessen the dangerously mounting international tension and the danger of a mistake that could have catastrophic consequences. . . .

The people of the United States have been conditioned to the requirement of adequate inspection to assure the effectiveness of nuclear weapons agreements for 12 years. I hazard the opinion that American public opinion would be unwilling to accept anything less.

### **Inspection System Only One Hurdle**

From all I have seen and heard of the Russians during this conference, during a visit to Moscow last year and from consistent public statements of Russian officials, they will not accept an effective inspection and control system.

But even if Russia did accept, this is but the first of four big hurdles for an effective inspection, detection and control system. The unanimous report of the conference of experts, representing the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., recommends a minimum of 37 control posts and inspection teams for Asia. Each team, according to the experts, would require approximately 30 technicians. No estimate of supporting personnel is given, but a total of 100 people for each team would appear reasonable.

This would mean then approximately 3,700 people, as a minimum, to be stationed in Asia. Moreover, they must be free to move over the vast territory to make examinations and inspections.

Even if Russia agrees to this—of which I have seen no sign—what reason is there to believe that Red China will permit several hundred people to peer into her dark corners? Who is to bring her into the agreement? Are we to sign a treaty with

a nation we do not recognize? What about other parts of the world—France, Australia, South America and Africa? The experts recommend an international control agency with a world-wide control system.

And then in the unlikely event that Russia, Red China and all other nations agree and adhere to a treaty to stop tests and admit and permit the necessary movement of inspection teams, who is to pay for it? The cost would soon mount into billions.

As I have contemplated all these steps and several more of lesser but still essential importance, together with questionable effectiveness in detecting small underground tests, I have the feeling that our delegation in Geneva may be undertaking to negotiate the unattainable. At best, the chances of obtaining all these necessary agreements are very remote.

What then does the United States do? What action and position should our government take, having in mind the necessity to maintain our moral and political position as well as to maintain our military strength?

A consideration of this requires an acknowledgment that our country has been severely blamed for contaminating the world's atmosphere with radioactive fallout. We have suffered more blame in this regard than is due. It is possible that public opinion overemphasizes the hazard of fallout.

The Russians took advantage of the unfortunate involvement of this question in our presidential campaign of 1956 and have been beating us over the head with distorted propaganda ever since. How then do we square ourselves?

### **Bar Atmospheric Tests**

I believe we can and should attempt to do so by taking a forthright first step, by offering to stop all atmospheric tests either unilaterally

for a period of three years or to enter into a binding treaty with the British and the Russians to do so permanently.

There are two important factors here:

1. It is from atmospheric detonations that most of all atmospheric contamination comes and,

2. Present detection stations and systems have demonstrated effectiveness in detecting atmospheric explosions.

Strengthening of these detection methods and facilities would be far less complicated than a cumbersome and extensive system and organization necessary for inspection of all forms of weapon tests.

There are at least five major kinds of nuclear explosions necessarily a part of the negotiations which we still hope to get under way in Geneva—atmospheric, suboceanic, underground, outer space, peaceful uses. Of these five, as I have said, the atmospheric is the most anti-social and at the same time the most easily detected.

Why not start with this? It is an attainable goal as compared with what appears to me to be the unattainable goal now set for our delegations.

One successful major first step might very well lead to others. The United States could show that it is willing to stop, that it will stop contaminating the world atmosphere. Any other nation that refuses to do so must bear the full blame for her act. I recommended such a course of action to President Eisenhower.

### Stop Tests

*Statement by the Council of the Federation of American Scientists made public on November 24, 1958.*

Recent calculations, based on official information, indicate that there are probably enough large nuclear bombs in present stockpiles to de-

On November 10 the Foreign Policy Association marked its 40th Anniversary, and during the months immediately ahead we are launching the most extensive campaign of citizen world affairs education in our history. To carry out this task the Association will cooperate with and assist a wide range of national and local organizations in presenting the most important issues of foreign policy — “Great Decisions” — to the American public. The seriousness of these issues for the nation, together with the leadership which the rest of the world expects of the United States, has led the Association to undertake early in 1959 a national educational campaign on these Great Decisions, concentrated in 14 major metropolitan centers and in at least six state-wide areas, reaching into a total of 300-400 communities in 33 states. It is anticipated on the basis of past performance by FPA that this effort will reach between 5 million and 10 million Americans. Great Decisions articles are presently appearing in the BULLETIN.

In order to make this major effort we must raise much more money from the public than ever before — at least \$509,000 out of a total budget of \$1,212,500. We need support from every quarter, and we are appealing to our friends, subscribers, contributors and all interested parties to help.

JOHN W. NASON, *President*

stroy the human race. This could be accomplished by the blanket of radioactive material which could be laid down by the explosion of a massive number of nuclear bombs. For example, if even a fraction of present stockpiles were exploded on the territory of even a large country, a deposit of radioactive material would be produced of such intensity that all life in the open would be destroyed, and life would not be possible on the surface of the earth until about one to three years had passed.

It would furthermore be possible for a fanatical ruler to pull down the entire human race to destruction. With a stockpile of the size that now exists, it is possible to cover the entire earth with a radiation level which for ten years would remain sufficiently intense to prove fatal to all living beings on land. This could be brought about by a decision of a small number of people.

### National Security Impossible

The argument has been advanced that continued testing is important to develop defensive weapons that would be effective in providing protection. But expert opinion has been given to the effect that there is not, and very likely never will be, any meaningful defense against massive attack. It may be possible to inflict destruction on an opponent, but no nation can any longer give protection and security to its own people. Only a 100 percent defense can prevent annihilation, and 100 percent defense can never be expected, especially in the first stage of an intensive attack.

We have thus come to a new period in history, in which the human race can destroy itself. The new weapons of mass destruction are too dangerous to be left under sovereign national control. In these circumstances our primary goal must be to bring these weapons under interna-



tional control. A universal test cessation, under international inspection, offers promise of being the most practicable first step toward international control of mass destruction weapons.

Although it is the responsibility of the military to seek further development of weapons of all types, it must be stressed that security is not available through military means. Therefore an objective of moving toward effective disarmament must come before considerations of technical improvements which further testing might produce in nuclear weapons.

We urge that the parties negotiating on a test cessation agreement not stand on any narrow position which will impede an agreement leading toward the major goal. The negotiators must adopt all reasonable measures which will provide satisfactory assurance to all parties that no further significant nuclear weapons development will occur.

An acceptable agreement must include the immediate establishment of an effective test detection system, which the 'experts' conference [at Geneva in August 1958] reported to be technically feasible. As to the initial period of test cessation, we should agree to a permanent ban, subject only to the condition that the detection system be put into operation within an agreed period. Cer-

tainly any cessation period limited in duration must be longer than the period required merely to prepare another series of test explosions. . . .

The next *Headline Series*—January-February — will be, "New Directions in U.S. Foreign Economic Policy," by Richard N. Gardner.

## Spotlight

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effort to indicate that the Africans have interests of their own which may not always coincide with those of Asia and the Middle East. The Bandung conference, however, was mentioned at the Asian-African economic conference in Cairo attended by 39 nations—but primarily in connection with efforts to exclude delegates of the U.S.S.R. (which had not participated in Bandung), on the ground that it is neither Asian nor African. The initial protest against the presence of Russian delegates (at Bandung the U.S.S.R. had been represented only by observers) was raised by Indonesia, the host nation in 1955.

The delegates at Cairo, for the most part businessmen and industrialists, indicated that they did not always agree with their governments. When the Soviet delegation

the foreign and economic policy of the United States, several of the Arab nations joined Turkey and Japan in defeating this resolution on December 9. Among the delegations which voted against it were Iraq, India, the Sudan, the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia.

At both conferences it became clear that Nasser's aspiration to play an important role in Africa is being challenged by African leaders, notably Nkrumah and Sekou Touré, a former trade union leader, now prime minister of newly independent Guinea, which proclaimed its independence from France in the September 1958 referendum. The dramatic decision of Ghana and Guinea on November 23, 1958 to form a union, in spite of the fact that the former is a member of the British Commonwealth and the latter still hopes to maintain economic ties with the French Community, was an important step toward other efforts to unify African territories as they win statehood. Today the United States of Africa is as yet only a dream for the future. But as the process of unification gets under way, the Africans are not only discovering their own continent. They are also discovering the new problems of contests among their own leaders for dominance in African affairs.

—VERA MICHELES DEAN

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Argentina Moving Toward Democracy,

by Herbert L. Matthews

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